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Introduction

The University of Nebraska ... has just issued the first number of
the Mid-West Quarterl)', a magazine interesting in itself and even
more interesting as a sign of the times .... the articles might be
called academic by those who have become accustomed even to
the better of our commercial magazines, but they are addressed
... to the smaller public, and they are academic in the good sense
of the word-thoughtful discussions of the deeper problems of
the day as seen from the angle where literature and education
and life meet and cross one another. This Quarterly will be taken
by some as a confirmation of the common opinion that the brains
of the country are draining from our Eastern to our Western
institutions. But that is another, and very tangled, story.
Nation, 20 November 1913

PAUL ELMER MORE, the editor of the Nation, had several motives
for celebrating the birth of the Mid-West Quarterly. He was a close
friend of its editor, Prosser Hall Frye, and he believed it would
contribute signally to a movement of which he and Irving Babbitt,
more than a decade before, had been the pioneers: the new, or
neo-, humanism. More himself was just completing a two-year stint
as editor of the Nation, and under his guidance it had become not
only the most intelligent conservative journal in America, but also,
in the opinion of many, the best literary review in the English
language. More would be resigning its editorship, however, by the
time the second issue of the Quarterly appeared in January 1914,
and the Nation would feel his loss. In 1914, too, was founded the
New Republic, another, but very different, "sign of the times."
Frye had come to know More through his brother, Louis Trenchard More, then teaching, like Frye, at the University of Nebraska, and Frye had been on intimate terms with Paul since 1899,
when he and his new wife visited the More brothers at Paul's retreat
in Shelburne, New Hampshire. They corresponded frequently and
VII
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at length until Frye's death in 1934. 1 A glance at his essays or the
Frye-More letters will show Frye's loyal but lively allegiance to neohumanism. His dedicating to More his most famous book, Romance
and Tragedy (1922), elicited one of More's best-known remarks: "I
am obliged to say that the dedication may work you a mischief. I
have gained the rather sad preeminence of being at once the least
read and the worst hated author in the country."2 A year earlier,
when Frye had sought his permission for the dedication, More
observed that "our only hope of accomplishing anything at all is to
give the impression that there is a considerable group of us hanging together." He describes the neohumanists as an embattled
group (H. L. Mencken had recently fulminated against them) and
welcomes into "the circle of the damned" Frye's colleague, S. B.
Gass, the second most important contributor to the Quarterly.3 It is
not strange, then, that the new humanism should find ample space
on the pages of Frye's journal.
But Frye was a pioneering scholar and critic in his own right.
One of his most illustrious colleagues, H. B. Alexander, described
him as "the dean of the group of critical and belles-Iettrist authors
which the University of Nebraska has produced." Many years later
he is still recalled as one of the leaders of a "vital literary movement." And the highly respected first editor of the Prairie Schooner,
Lowry Wimberly, considered him "the most intellectual man he
had known."4 Under his direction, the Quarterly became for a few
years one of the most articulate organs of the new humanism. Both
S. B. Gass and P. M. Buck, good friends of Frye and prolific writers
for the journal, were some dozen years his juniors and were clearly
influenced by his thought. Other contributors, whether Nebraskans like Louise Pound and Langworthy Taylor, or outsiders like
Robert Shafer and Hardin Craig, also reflect the values of neohumanism. There are of course a great variety of articles and viewpoints, and Frye was no tyrannical editor, but the only significant
contributor who is not patently a neohumanist is H. B. Alexander.
The Quarterly was published by G. P. Putnam's, the same conservative house that had been issuing More's Shelburne Essays, and the
Quarterly, like the Essays, was an important medium for the early
expression of neohumanism.
It is no part of my purpose to undertake a history of the new
humanism. That has already been adequately done, and several
good articles and books have appeared on its chief advocates, Babbitt and More. 5 Moreover, in the course of analyzing Frye's Quarterly essays, it will be possible to identify many of the central posi-
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tions of neohumanism. Nevertheless, some preliminary definitions
may be useful.
The Quarterly ran from 1913 to 1918. The intellectual currents in
these years have been examined very carefully by Henry F. May in
The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own
Time, 1912-1917. May argues that the striking changes in American culture and philosophy found in the twenties can be traced, not
merely to the Great War, but to the years immediately antecedent.
Before 1912 Americans subscribed, he says, to three basic articles
of faith: absolute moral values (moralism), the inevitability of progress, and, to a lesser degree, culture. Other related ideals were
democracy, uplift, optimism, reform. The unfair but popular caricature of Woodrow Wilson represents the type. European, particularly British, culture was admired, and especially the Victorian
humanist Matthew Arnold, although commentators generally affirmed the superiority of America in its political and social dimensions. It was, May says, a time of "sureness and unity, at least on the
surface," but the intellectual consensus was too facile, and would be
challenged, well before the war, from several different directions.
For example, the classical, conservative notion of education as
transmitter and preserver of culture was doubly attacked: by the
Deweyites in the interests of pragmatism, and by others on behalf
of vocationalism. Naturalism in its many forms (Marxism, behaviorism, pragmatism, the novels of Zola and Dreiser, the "Ash
Can" school of painting) undermined conventional notions of man
as a spiritual and moral being. Moral norms also seemed to be
assaulted by revivals of romantic aestheticism, Nietzschean egoism,
critical impressionism. Anglo-Saxon traits were depreciated in
favor of fashionably "oppressed" races or nationalities: not so much
the Negro as yet, but chiefly the Italians and the Slavs. The Boas
school of cultural relativism prevailed among much of the intelligentsia. The intuitionalism of Bergson, and new movements in
poetry such as imagism and free verse, threatened the ideals of
order and rationality. Even the motion picture was hailed as revolutionizing education, and Edison proclaimed the obsolescence
of books in the classroom. Of course conservatives and traditionalists, the "defenders of culture" as May terms them, reacted to all
these assaults, but May urges that their cause had been fatally
weakened by their own superficiality, and that the Great War only
accelerated its ultimate collapse.
May gives surprisingly little space to the new humanism, however. One reason may be that the movement itself failed to gain
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momentum till the twenties and thirties, well beyond the compass
of his study. But it is also true that on the few occasions when May
mentions Babbitt or More, he has trouble categorizing them. To be
sure, they are in some ways conservatives; yet they loathed as much
as any of the rebels the vapidity and optimism of the "defenders of
culture." He remarks that Babbitt and More were defending, not,
like the other conservatives, American nineteenth-century culture,
but "much older forms and beliefs," and this may explain why
"their conservatism survived the overthrow of the culture of
1912."6 Writers for the Quarterly oppose most of the new currents
charted by May: vocational or pragmatic theories of education, the
many faces of naturalism, irrationality, imagism, and vers libre. The
motion pictures, just maturing in 1914 with Birth' of a Nation, are
mentioned only twice, both times briefly and disparagingly (the
sarcastic title of one article is "Movie Democracy"). Like other conservatives, the neohumanists of the Quarterly defend traditional
morality, admire Arnold and other elements of European culture
(even British spelling is regularly adhered to), take pride in the
Anglo-Saxon heritage and character. On the other hand, the Quarterly writers do not share with some other conservatives an uncritical
allegiance to: the inevitability of progress, the self-evident
superiority of American democratic institutions, the optimism, the
belief in reform or "moral uplift." Furthermore, most of the major
articles are sensitive, intelligent expositions, not knee-jerk reactions
or diatribes. Thus the Quarterly not only is neohumanist in its bent,
but shares conspicuously in the strengths of that movement. As a
consequence, many of its articles have retained a freshness and
even relevance despite the lapse of nearly seventy years.
Humanism is a term most recalcitrant to definition. Selfproclaimed humanists are found on all sides of the prewar intellectual picture as May presents it, and the term, unqualified, means
little more than a disposition to view the arts as an important expression of man's nature and a central part of his education and
culture. A humanist can be politically liberal or conservative; he can
admire or contemn Bergson. or the movies. But neohumanism can
be defined more rigorously, for as More's remarks quoted earlier
show, it was a distinctive movement or school, led nationally by
Babbitt and More, and at the University of Nebraska by Frye. My
discussion of Frye will, I hope, identify more precisely some of the
central tenets of neohumanism; and an examination of the other
contributors will suggest the range of disagreements possible
within it, for even movements or schools have their dissentient
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voices. Suffice it for now that the new humanism was opposed to
most of the modernist tendencies described so accurately by May.
But it was an attack at once more penetrating and universal than
most of the other conservative, prewar reactions, and it avoids in
the main the triteness, the complacency, or the righteous indignation so often a part of those reactions. The new humanism emanated from the East, and especially from Babbitt's Harvard, where
three of the six scholars featured in Chapter 1 earned degrees. The
Quarterly, along with the books of Babbitt and More then appearing, represents an important early phase in the development of
that movement. It also reflects a significant and hitherto unexplored phase in the intellectual life of the University of Nebraska.
Frye was by disposition a reticent classicist, and he imparted to
his journal a tone of sober and earnest disquisition. Among its
pages shall be found no editorials, no profiles of contributors, and
assuredly nothing so casual and informative as a department of
letters. No file of correspondence has apparently survived which
would illuminate the quotidian business of its existence, although it
is clear that Frye was chiefly responsible for its inception and continued life. The recollection of S. B. Gass, twenty years later, is of
interest:
In 1913 the University undertook the most ambitious adventure in publication of its
career-The Mid-West Quarterly. The conception was Mr. Frye's, and the execution
was his. For four years he labored at it writing for it, reading contributions, accepting or rejecting, sometimes virtually rewriting them, editing, proof-reading. And the
reward was a critical journal of highest character that at once won general acclaim.
The reward was also a breakdown that sent the editor south for a year's leave of
absence. The "Quarterly" survived for another year, but proved to be one of the
casualties of the war.7

What the records show is this: that P. M. Buck and H. B. Alexander successfully requested Chancellor Avery to submit to the
board of regents a proposal for a university quarterly which would
provide a "medium for the literary output of some of our professors, to extend the influence of the University in academic circles."
This item was duly placed on the agenda of the board of regents
for 2 May 1913, and that body tentatively approved the publishing
of a 112-page quarterly of one thousand copies for the first halfyear, and after that for as many copies as subscriptions required,
but under no circumstances for fewer than five hundred. The university was instructed to appropriate fifteen hundred dollars annually for two years to cover printing costs, and all earnings of the
journal were to be turned over to the cash fund of the university.8
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A committee, established to investigate further, reported back
favorably, stipulating that "Professor Frye will be in immediate
charge of the publication."9 This recommendation was made on 17
June, and the first number, dated October, appeared in early
November. 10
The Quarterly was well received. The student newspaper notes,
on the appearance of the second number, that "many favorable
and commendable [sic] letters have been received. Favorable comments have also been made in the critical columns of well know[n]
newspapers and magazines of the country."11 Olivia Pound supports this assertion a few years later: "The Quarterly has contained
contributions from writers and scholars of note, and has received
much commendation from savants in many parts of the United
States."12 The puff in the Nation was thus not unique or outrageously partial. Financing was apparently no problem,13 and worthy submissions were not far to seek. The quality remains high to
the end, and although Lincolnites occupied the entire first number,
the Quarterly was soon publishing articles from all over the country. 14
Frye's health, however, proved to be an insuperable difficulty.
He requested, and the board of regents approved, a "leave of absence ... on account of ill health" at the end of 1916. 15 As frequently befalls publications in such circumstances, printing
schedules lapsed or were abandoned. According to the University
journal, the January 1918 issue appeared in October of that year,
and the July 1918 issue is reported as 'just off the press" in October
1919. 16 P. M. Buck became editor in its last year, but after he secured the deanship of the Arts and Sciences College in 1919, his
energies were doubtless diverted to more exigent matters. No one
else, apparently, was eager to take up the task, and of course the
war interfered. Except for occasional reminiscences by a few contributors, the Quarterly seems to have dropped quickly from the
remembrance of posterity. 17
The Quarterly was intended, according to Avery's agenda for the
regents, to be a medium for the "literary output" of Nebraska
professors to enhance the academic prestige of the university.
Frye's own statement of purpose, proclaimed on the back covers of
the magazine, is loftier in phrase and sentiment:
The Mid-West Quarterly has been established by the University of Nebraska in the
belief that there exists in this country a quantity of excellent writing for which there
is no adequate medium of publication. While exact scholarship, the discovery and
verification of fact, has received any amount of encouragement and stimulation, the
cultivation of general ideas, the free play of the intelligence, what Matthew Arnold
would broadly call criticism, has met of late years with neglect if not with actual
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disfavor. The results of "scientific" investigation and research. if valuable at all. are
pretty sure of being taken up by some of the journals devoted to the application of
special methods to special subjects. For the intellectual essay of a critical character.
however. there is small opening .... it is the hope of enlarging the opportunities of
those who are interested in this manifestation of mental activity. irrespective of
territorial limitations. which has led to the establishment of The Mid-West Quarterly.

In the agenda description can be detected the pragmatism of an
administrator, and in Frye's the idealism of a novice editor. But in
truth Frye's is the more nearly accurate. The Quarterly did become
more than a regional magazine, though the Nebraska contributors
set the general tone, and the emphasis in the articles, as Frye
claims, is on literary, philosophical, pedagogical, and occasionally,
historical or sociopolitical subjects of scholarly import but general
appeal. Frye's reference to Arnold suggests its neohumanist bent.
Aside from its importance in the history of neohumanism, then,
there are several reasons for being interested in the Quarterly.
It was, for example, published at the term of the university's
"golden years" and hence affords insight into the caliber and concerns of the faculty at that time. Is Many controversial issues are
debated in extenso: the Great War, changing conceptions of the
liberal arts curricula, modernism in the arts, feminism, socialism,
and pacifism, the role of historical scholarship and linguistics in
literary criticism.
Then too, Frye was an exacting stylist and thinker, and this
scrupulosity can be discerned in his selection and editing of articles.
The general excellence of the magazine becomes particularly conspicuous when it is compared with a similar publication, Quarterly
Journal of the University of North Dakota, for the same years. The
essays there are narrowly conceived, largely parochial and ephemeral. For this reason I have spent some time examining the major
arguments of the most important articles. This is the only way to
get a sense of what the magazine represented, and the points of
view propounded are frequently quite germane to our present
controversies. I have also, usually in the notes, glanced at some
subsequent expressions or developments of its authors' ideas to
suggest something of the pioneering role of the Quarterly and its
connection with later neohumanism.
I take up in the first chapter the most significant of the Nebraska
humanists at that time, a group about which little has been written
collectively or individually. Here I have attempted to assess their
major contributions to the journal and to adumbrate similarities
and distinctions among them. To represent more adequately the
entire range of the magazine, however, I have judged it necessary
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to include a second chapter, organized around subjects rather than
authors, where I consider less prolific Nebraska humanists and
non-Nebraskans. No attempt has been made to discuss every article
in the magazine. There are some too slight, ephemeral, or repetitive of other essays to merit attention; there are others, good
enough in themselves, but too specialized to interest even the
reader of this monograph. Since no index has ever been assembled
for the Quarterly, I have provided one, and there, of course, the
entire contents may be surveyed. This index includes the volume
number and dates of all the articles; hence, the references to articles in my text will include only page numbers.
I am indebted to the University of Nebraska Research Council
for a Fling Summer Fellowship which enabled me to complete this
study. I must also thank Professor Robert E. Knoll and Professor
Joseph Svoboda, for their assistance and advice.

1. The Nebraska Humanists
SECTION ONE:
PROSSER HALL FRYE

A

STUDY OF THE Quarterly must begin with Frye. It was clearly his
conception, and it bears everywhere the impress of his thought.
Born in New York City in 1866, educated at Trinity College, Connecticut, Harvard, and the University of Strasbourg, he came to
Nebraska in 1896 and by 1910 was head of the Department of
Rhetoric. He was a pioneer in studies of comparative literature,
and published incisive essays in such places as the Independent, the
Bookman, the Nation, and the University of Nebraska Studies. These in
due course were collected in three books: Literary Reviews and Criticisms (1908), Romance and Tragedy (1922), and Visions and Chimeras
(1929). A posthumous volume of essays on Plato was published in
1938. I have elsewhere discussed the entire range of Frye's criticism.! But since he published in the Quarterly several of his most
representative and substantial essays, an examination of these will
provide at once a satisfactory introduction to Frye, to the predominant themes in the Quarterly, and to the neohumanists in general.
Frye's first essay defines a polarity fundamental to neohumanism,
romanticism versus classicism; the second essay argues in detail the
inferiority of romanticism; the third proposes a neohumanist critical theory; the last pieces take up two philosophers who best embody the classical and the romantic ideals, Plato and Nietzsche.
Frye's most seminal essay introduces the first number. Entitled
"The Terms 'Classic' and 'Romantic'," it sets forth the philosophical
and aesthetic point d'appui of Frye and most of the other
neohumanists. 2 Romanticism is of course their great antagonist,
and one cannot do better than to quote Frye's own catalog of its
qualities:
A susceptibility to irregular beauty, a fondness for the striking and the unusual even
at the expense of regularity and order. a preference for fascinating detail above
symmetry and proportion. a predilection for the coruscations of style-for the glittering word and phrase, for the exotic and exquisite epithet. for everything that
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touches and thrills and dazzles, a hunger for sensation, even when these desires lead
to a dissipation of the attention-such are its external qualities as far as it is profitahle to analyse them at present. [Po 10]

Allied with romanticism is naturalism. These may at first seem to be
opposites: the one esteems subjectivity and passion, and the other
tends to see man as shaped by external forces; the one traces back
to Rousseau, the other to Bacon; at their most extreme, the one
deifies emotion, the other produces the zealous technocrat or behaviorist. Yet both view man as too much a part of nature and deny
the rational, moral, or supernatural elements which make for the
distinctly human. In addition, they both confound literature with
"life" (defined as subjective feeling by romanticism, or confined to
what is empirically demonstrable by naturalism), and consequently
they have sundered modern literature from the moral idea, which
in classical literature rightly predominates, To put it another way,
truly classical or humanistic literature is concerned more to interpret life in the light of ethical ideas rather than "neutrally" to image
or represent it. Romanticism or naturalism, however, is more interested in life as sensation or spectacle, or at most as an illustration
of some allegedly scientific or physical law; when it trenches on
morality, it seldom offers more than trite sentimentality or
humanitarianism. The journalist is the basest of this type, but even
the best writers share in his defects, and, for Frye, these include
Shakespeare, Hugo, Tolstoy, and Zola,
To the classicist, however, "life is at bottom an illustration of
moral principles, whose main interest is human and rational" (p.
20). From classical literature we expect an "unflinching moral vision" characteristic of such writers as Sophocles; from romantic
writers we get only the protean and nebulous perspectives of subjectivity. To speak more precisely, in the classical literature we observe an Oedipus, condemned by his deeds despite his good intentions; in the romantic we have a Hamlet, in whom we are invited to
pity that very irresoluteness and quivering sensibility which a
Sophocles would likely have scorned. The Oedipus Rex is thus an
"ideal" tragedy, while Hamlet is merely a naturalistic tragedy of
character strongly enforcing no certain moral norms. Sophocles
views life from an ethical vantage; Shakespeare, like the "amoral"
romantic or naturalist, throws himself uncritically into its multifarious and fluctuating phenomena.
We are at present in a romantic and naturalistic period, but Frye
sees romanticism and classicism sub specie aeternitatis. They represent for him two perennial "dispositions of spirit," and he desires a
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new "fundamental literary criticism" which will be cognizant of
these two dispositions and scrutinize literature in its unique capacity as a medium of moral ideas. As such a medium, literature differs from the other fine arts, which are not directly ideational, and
also from the flux and chaos of life (as the romanticist-naturalist
defines it). Comparative literature, Frye correctly predicts, will be
particularly suited to perform this function, for we can define certain universal ideas and moral principles only by contrast.
"German Romanticism," the lead essay in the second number,
dissects more precisely the romantic extreme. Like the romanticists
arraigned in the first essay, the German writers confuse together
man and thing. As naturalists they view morality as merely an illusion at whose source are the galvanic responses of the ego; yet as
romantics they praise these responses-inconsistently in view of
their mechanistic beliefs-as liberating or self-fulfilling. For
Americans, Emerson is the most familiar embodiment of these
views. He has the same "sententious, fragmentary manner":
What New England transcendentalism amounted to in the end ... was, like German
romanticism, the apotheosis of a purely ideal and sentimental ego above character
and conduct at large, and the arbitrary elevation of the dicta of this ego into a code
of morality .... It is just the philosophy for a race and a generation ... which wishes
to be free to defraud its neighbours in the morning and boast of its moral elevation
in the evening. [Po 1 17]

To this view Frye opposes, not the Greek classicism celebrated in
his previous essay, but Hinduism with its stress on man's spiritual
withdrawal into the ideal world from the flux of outward circumstance. The dualism inherent in the Hindu scheme particularly
appeals to him. It properly distinguishes between man and nature
and emancipates man from the "law for thing, the mechanical determinations of a material cosmos" so beloved of the romanticistnaturalist (p. 118). Yet in that very emancipation it gives man
power over himself: self-control. Thus this essay, like the first,
opposes romantic egoism and naturalist materialism. Here, however, he bears down on the nineteenth-century Germans and transcendentalists as specific embodiments of this "disposition." And he
joins to the Greek classicism of the first essay the Hindu expression
of the same. In this way he demonstrates that classicism is indeed a
perennial pattern manifested in many ages and cultures.
Introducing the third number is his "Literature and Criticism,"
and it follows logically the first two. Frye is assiduous to distinguish
true criticism from both impressionism (romanticism) and historical scholarship (naturalism). Historical scholarship is concerned
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with the facts or origin of works of art, true CrItiCism with interpretation; and if, as Frye has posited in the earlier essays, literature belongs to the moral rather than the naturalistic or scientific
sphere, then criticism, though not as "scientific" as scholarship, has
yet a noble purpose: "to liberate the idea, to set free the message
[the work] has to communicate" (p. 188). The other extremeimpressionistic criticism-is patently but a manifestation of romanticism in which the reader's ego is substituted for a disinterested
study of the work. In stressing that criticism should examine the
work itself, and expecially the moral conception of life set forth
therein, Frye strikingly anticipates the concerns of the "New Critics," though he would be wary of the sterile explication de texte and
avoidance of value judgments characteristic of some of that school.
But if we are to appreciate his courage and iconoclasm, we must
recall that Frye was, indeed, writing before the rise of that movement, at a time when historical scholarship was generally esteemed
above "mere" criticism. For Frye, good literary criticism, like classical literature, maneuvers between the Scylla of romanticism and
the Charybdis of naturalism (two monsters which for the
neohumanists have combined to form a third):
And inasmuch as the life which is both the subject and object ofliterature, is neither
scientific nor yet unprincipled but broadly moral; our criticism will be neither scientific nor impressionistic, but will consist in a free play of the intelligence just as life
does. It will be based on general principles, which, though elastic, are broader than
the observation of a single case, and which are capable of being explained and
justified, as our conduct is, rationally and intelligibly, if nothing more. [Po 196]

Frye's last essays take up Plato and Nietzsche, philosophers who
exemplify the two antithetical dispositions of spirit. Although some
may view Plato, the architect of the Republic, as a utopian~,~nd
protosocialist, Frye and the neohumanists regarded him as a classicist. The Republic is not to be taken literally, but as a kind of
allegory of the mind or human society. Frye admires in Plato what
he praised in Hinduism: the stress on the superiority of ideas to the
mundane flux and on the supremacy of order and hierarchy in the
individual soul and in society. He also shares Plato's distrust of the
egalitarian ideal, the product equally of romantic and naturalistic
prejudice. He concedes that Plato's hierarchical scheme appears at
times too rigorous and petrific, and that its socialistic propensities
are apt to obscure the value of the individual. Yet finally Plato, in
his politics, is like the good writer and the good critic. In emphasizing the human and the ethical element, he preserves government from becoming either an undisciplined democracy III
which the lower passions prevail, or a "mere technology."
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Frye's last substantial essay is a full-dress assault on romanticism
and-in Frye's view-its most noisy and notorious prophet. The
first section, a biography proper, is an artful and engrossing narrative, pervaded by a delicate irony, though indeed the second section, addressing Nietzsche's thought, is no less ironical. Nietzsche is
protrayed as the opposite of Plato: a disbeliever in the Ideas, even
in truth as such, and a romantic enthusiast of the emotions and the
ego. At the same time, he is the supreme naturalist in his yearning
for a superman who will manage and purify society. And just as
Plato, the more Frye contemplated him, seemed a source of true
wisdom, so in Nietzsche "almost all our modern heresies ... find an
oracular mouthpiece-with the one exception of social democracy.
He was born to be the prophet of the one-sided and unbalanced"
(p. 332).
Frye's essays, placed as they all are at the beginnings of the earliest issues, deliberately propound a coherent and sophisticated
point of view. In the first, the chief oppositions of the classic and
romantic sensibilities are delineated. In the rest of the essays, the
classical mode is exemplified by Hinduism, Platonism, and
Sophoclean tragedy, while egotism, naturalism, and scientism are
embodied variously in such men as Shakespeare, the German
romantics, and Emerson. The series concludes with a penetrating
and acidulous study of Nietzsche as the great heresiarch and prophet of modernism.
Through these essays run principles and preoccupations commonly discovered in the neohumanists: an emphasis on the moral
and ideational aspects of literature joined with a distrust of literature or criticism concerned with mere spectacle, the physical world,
or emotion; a belief in the inherent veracity of dualism with its
distinctions between reason and passion, man and nature, the one
(the central, the universal) and the many (the flux); a distrust of
emotionalism and egotism and subjectivism, whether in literature,
criticism, or life, accompanied by a concern for self-restraint, the
inner check-in short, for personal, social, and philosophical order;
a distrust also of the more exorbitant claims of positivism and scientism, but at the same time a refusal to appeal explicitly to the
theologies or dogmas of conventional religion (in their place we are
offered Eastern religion, Platonism, or Arnold's free play of the
moral intelligence). These positions are occupied with great intricacy of analysis and forcibleness of style, and though Frye possessed firm views, the scholar and critic seldom sink into the partisan.
Frye's very point d'appui-the distinction between classicism and
romanticism-was from the start attacked as too rigid, and later
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scholars have argued strongly for abolishing the terms altogether.
Yet they have continued to be useful, and many critics, in their
efforts to shun them, have lapsed into an even less helpful and
more repulsive jargon. Moreover, there is much to be said for
Frye's belief that the terms denote two perennial philosophies or at
least sensibilities, similar in essence if different in details. The distinctions between the two, which may seem heavy-handed in summary, seldom strike one as so in Frye's practical criticism. He is
weakest, I believe, on Shakespeare, though it is not uncommon for
classicists to be immune from that "Shakespeare idolatry" still very
powerful among professors of English. Certainly his views on the
German romantics and the transcendentalists are very plausible. I
shall consider in my general conclusion his refusal-and that of the
neohumanists in general-to appeal to Christian theology.
Perhaps in the end style is Frye's best claim to distinction among
his fellow neohumanists. Elegant without decadence, subtle in vocabulary but vigorous in tone, it has the confidence but not, in the
main, the distracting vaticinations and tendentiousness of Babbitt's.
P. E. More's style, at least in his later works, seems more effortless
but also less memorable and pungent.

SECTION

Two:

SHERLOCK BRONSON GASS

S. B. Gass was born in Ohio in 1878, studied at the University of
Chicago, and came to Nebraska in 1905. He was self-professedly a
neohumanist and recognized as such in the 1930 manifesto
Humanism and America. He is recalled by a colleague as "one who
could question currently fashionable opinion."3 His essays are not
mere echoes of Frye, but also show the influence of the less
belligerent, more diffusive humanism of H. B. Alexander. 4 He is
less vehement in his tone than Frye, and more psychological than
philosophical in his manner.
Gass is most clearly Frye'S protege in his first article, "The Intrusions of Science." This appeared in the first number with Frye's
piece on classicism and romanticism, and it elaborates several
themes introduced in that essay. Agreeing that the naturalist and
the romantic are congeners, he reproaches the arrogance and
dogmatism of the scientist, who, he argues, is particularly vulnerable to the blandishments of romanticism; the scientist has developed no classical sensibility to withstand them. 5 In a very acute
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analysis, Gass shows how the sciences shade off into the humanities
as their subjects become increasingly connected with life and hence
less susceptible to the imposition of strict categories (for example,
mathematics is more "exact" than biology, which is more so than
history, which is more so than sociology, and so on) (pp. 67-68).
Literary scholars, in endeavoring to be scientists, have thus conceived a scorn for the "inexact" art of criticism. But the critic,
argues Gass, understands his own province and is concerned with
determining the true value and significance of a work. The naturalistic scholars make a fuss over the historical circumstances of a
Hamlet, for example, but to what end unless someone is also prepared to delineate the essential value of the play itself (pp. 69-70)?
Like Frye, Gass thus anticipates in some respects the "New Critics."
The quasi-scientific procedures employed by literary historians
have promoted a decline or even desuetude of critical judgment, so
that the slightest work may be prized, not for any inherent merit,
but because it is old and thus provides grist for the ever grinding
mills of the historical scholars. Criticism must understand its purpose better and resist the supposedly value-free methods of naturalism.
The influence of Frye also dominates another essay, "Literature
as a Fine Art."6 Gass sees romanticism as an assertion of the senses
against the intellect, and develops further Frye's distinctions between literature and the other arts. Literature communicates ideas
or thoughts; it is essentially intellectual. A picture, on the other
hand, does not directly convey ideas, for that is the province only of
language: the same may be said of music, sculpture, architecture;
hence they appeal especially to the romantic. Of course these arts
may evoke ideas, and much thought may have entered into their
execution; that is another matter (pp. 280-82). We must not, he
continues, acquiesce in the flux of sublunary reality as the
romanticist-naturalist does. Rather, reason must postulate stable
prototypes in defiance of the flux, and this it should do even if we
are not totally convinced of the actual reality of the ideal prototype
(p. 285). Classic literature must try to apprehend the universal
ideas and types, but modern, neoromantic trends like imagism are
quite unsatisfactory; obsessed as they are with particularity, they
have abandoned the ideational purpose of literature (pp. 287-88).
One should note two aspects of Gass's thought particularly. For
developing more relentlessly than Frye the distinctions between
literature and the other arts, Gass would no doubt be rebuked by a
number of modern critics. In the face of semiotics and a more
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flexible understanding of the meaning of symbols, Gass's distinctions seem now too facile and uncompromising. Second, when discussing the imposition of types or ideas on the universal flux, Gass
occupies a significantly more subjective or psychological position
than Frye. Frye seems to believe that Plato viewed the Ideas as a
means of apprehending true reality, and he seems to have shared
that belief. Gass, on the other hand, tends to see our construction of
the prototypes as a way of rendering reality intelligible. This is an
important if complicated difference, the difference between perception and projection; but Gass does not indicate explicitly that he
understands the philosophical distance between him and Frye on
that matter. It must be conceded, of course, that scholars have not
agreed on what Plato himself meant by the Ideas: perhaps Gass
recognized this coil and decided it would be inutile to pursue the
distinction.
In "The Comedy of the Arts College" Gass addresses an altogether fresh topic and exhibits a greater independence of
thought. The arts college had once a high calling, for once "it had
stood in the midst of the chaos of life, stably anchored in the flux,
offering to those who came to it that detached, clarified vision and
perspective to which it itself had attained." But now, in courting
"the current romantic eccentricity," it has abandoned its traditionary concern and assumed "the intense and baffled look of the subject of comedy" (p. 268). Gass believes that students actually expect
from the arts college some coherent and unified discipline. This
coherence will also assist the teacher, for he will have a better notion when he enters his classroom of the preparation of his students
and can therefore function more effectively as an instructor. A set
curriculum, then, provides some order for the student, and at the
same time allows the teacher to construct his course upon a sound
foundation. The elective system, however, not only ensures aimlessness in the curriculum, but compels the professor, like the merchant, to survive by attracting customers. It is "a system calculated
to exercise every human weakness of both instructor and student"
(p. 274). Gass perceives the liabilities of a fixed curriculumnarrowness, inelasticity, etc.-but regards as worse the chaos inherent in the elective system (p. 277). Irving Babbitt had already denounced that system as "educational impressionism" in Literature
and the College (1908), but Gass's criticism is arguably more subtle
than Babbitt's, and really one of the shrewdest analyses of the elective system.
Gass's last two major essays, "A Modern Paradox" and "A Liberal
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Experience," best embody his tentative and psychological approach. These both use narrative and dialogue and were later incorporated into a curious, philosophical novel, A Lover of the Chair.
They are the most original of his contributions to the Quarterly, but
also the least amenable to paraphrase. In both, the elements of
narrative and dialogue are intrinsic to the theme and impart to the
pieces a suggestive and hypothetical tone conspicuously different
from the energy and aggressiveness of Frye. The first essay concerns methods of education, and concludes that democracies, to
survive, must train their majorities to govern themselves. A purely
vocational education cannot accomplish this, for it appeals chiefly
to the private, selfish interests-the "needs" they would be called
today-of the people. A democracy will destroy itself if it becomes
too narrowly "practical" in its educational policies. At the same
time, a separate, aristocratic education clashes too sharply with the
ideals of a democracy. Hence the paradox: an egalitarian society
must preserve in its educational system an "elitist" element if it is to
ensure a body of citizens educated in the loftier ideals and prepared to sacrifice material benefits for them. In "A Liberal Experience" Gass touches again on the fragmentary nature of modern
education, and chides liberalism for having at its center no moral
idea, but only a sympathy for the poor: a virtue, doubtless, but no
philosophy.7
Gass's first two essays show the intelligent pupil expounding on
the favorite themes of his mentor: the liabilities of romanticism, the
preeminence of the moral idea in literature. The essay on the arts
college, however, is an impressive defense of a traditional curriculum, argued not only on conservative Platonic, but on liberal
psychological, grounds (a set curriculum truly gives the students
what they both want and need, and makes for more effective
teachers as well). But Gass is most innovative in the last two essays,
which are in effect little dramas or dialogues decorated with
characters individualized just enough to intrigue us without distracting us from the philosophical issues. These dramatic essays
work towards an indirect, gentle criticism of liberal
humanitarianism. Always there is the reluctance to offend, to be
churlish or uncharitable, to deny the good feelings and genuine
altruism of the other side; hence the dialogue form, delicate and
psychological in its nature, is no mere factitious embellishment, but
an integral part.
Gass's contributions do at least two things: they build on and
develop ideas introduced in Frye's series of essays, and they employ
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a manner better calculated to appeal to the hesitant but openminded reader. Frye is the more expert writer and possibly the
more rigorous thinker; yet he pursues a more treacherous path.
His essays will inspire, excite, and probably sophisticate, those who
are already receptive to his philosophy. But some will be alienated
by a sort of testiness of style. It is not altogether fanciful to see in
Frye the Juvenalian, and in Gass the Horatian, arm of
neohumanism, Nebraska chapter.

SECTION THREE:

PHILO

M.

BUCK, JR.

Philo M. Buck, Jr., was Gass's exact contemporary. Born in New
Jersey in 1877, he was graduated from Ohio Wesleyan and Harvard, and came to Nebraska in 1910. Presently he became involved
in administrative work, and in 1926 left to be chairman of the
Department of Comparative Literature at the University of Wisconsin. Buck was one of the associate editors of the Quarterly, and
its chief editor during Frye's leave of absence. He wrote many
essays for it reflecting a neohumanist perspective, and it is arguable
that these pieces remain his best work. 8
In "Literature and Anti-Intellectualism" he attacks Bergson, who
had been lecturing in 1913 at Columbia. Bergsonism is antiintellectual in its romantic intuitionalism and its belief in ultimate
reality as movement or pure flux. Such a reality, Buck argues, can
have no signification, for "the restless, ever-changing flux of life, as
we perceive it in our emotions or our intuitions, has no more stable
ground for its truth than our reasoned abstractions" (p. 83). Imbued with the modern repudiation of reason and intellect, naturalism has persuaded us that we can have no definitive ethical
standards. All that remains for us, then, is emotional value: "Hence
the ruck of pictures, poems, and stories dealing with idiots, paupers, monsters, misfits generally, in bizarre, demoralizing, or dehumanising situations. Emotional significance is the only test the
[romantic] school can find, and to realise it art and literature must
seek the lives of those who defy humanity and the human tradition" (p. 89).9 Buck's point is that the Bergsonian anti-intellectual
and the scientist or naturalist conciliate too eagerly the ethical neutrality of the physical world. Regardless of whether moral order
can be demonstrated to be "in nature" or not, man has a natural
craving for it that must be satisfied. The purpose of art is to de-
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lineate the distinctively human qualities such as "character, reason,
ideals, morals." These, "though we may look in vain for them in the
flux, though they may be conventions or more or less inadequate
generalisations, must not be regarded as a flippancy, an irrelevancy, a cosmic jest. And it is with these human things that art and
literature have to do" (p. 92). Buck is closer to Gass than to Frye in
affirming only tentatively the absolute existence of moral ideas.
Indeed, he sometimes seems to lapse into what Frye or Babbitt
would have denigrated as modernist subjectivism and to admit that
we impose our own "absolutes" on the universal chaos. But even at
such moments he urges that we respect such impositions because
they are intrinsically and imperatively human.
Buck's other major essays are dialogues, a form which he adopts,
like Gass, to give his views dramatic appeal and resilience. In
"Curbs" he accuses the vers librists of discarding all tradition and
pandering to the worst in modern thought: the slipshod, the facile.
Though they claim to be egalitarian, they are in fact aristocratic,
and none indeed more so than Whitman, strutting in his most
unplebeian white suit. In abandoning all rules or curbs, they are
sequestering themselves from humanity and the authentic life of
the humane tradition and seeking solace in subjectivism and irrationalism: "Pretty soon someone will advocate an abandonment
of language, and insist that true poetry consists in the rhythm of
gestures and facial expression" (p. 202). It is evident that this aspersion of free verse-an assault, by the way, not merely academic but
fortified by some practicing poets like Frost-grows naturally out
of the suppositions of his earlier article. Indeed, though he never
quotes it, Buck seems to be arguing Burke's famous aphorism, "Art
is man's nature"-far from being false to nature, we are being true
to ourselves when we construct order (societies, moral systems,
symbols) around us. Despite the naturalist skepticism of a moral
design intrinsic to nature, man has a natural need for such a pattern, and art must answer that need.
Two of Buck's most inventive essays concern education. "Magnacum Confusione" laments the chaotic college curricula, affirms
the utility of classical education in the democratic state, and argues
that while progressive educators may oppose the hidebound traditionalism of a classical education, they call at the same time for such
state supervision and control as may foster a tyrannical and narrowly utilitarian pedagogy.
In "Puero Reverentia" Buck dramatizes with wit and sensitivity
two fundamental and probably antithetical attitudes towards ele-
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mentary education. We are shown on the one hand the zealous
proponents of the Montessori method, for whom the child is a free
soul to be joyously educated in all its spontaneity and innocence.
On the other hand, we have those who advocate discipline and
direction to overcome the natural debilities of childhood: "Do we
think that deep in the hidden recesses of the child's soul lies hid the
germ that shall one day blossom out in multiplication tables and
trigonometric formulae? Is the love of grammatical forms and
graphs innate and imbedded in a child's nature? Can we call out the
resolute will to face stern duty by morning romps over castles of
cardboard?" (p. 178). True, we must sometimes have the sugarcoated pill, but some pedagogues confound the sugar with the
substance. Through the dialogue form, Buck tolerantly but facetiously dramatizes the essential incompatibility of these two attitudes: attitudes between which the pendulum of pedagogical
fashion still swings regularly if in ever widening arcs. The weakest
claim of the apologists of Montessori, he contends, is that it is
universally applicable and can be extended into the upper reaches
of education: "There comes a time, and that earlier than most of us
suspect, when the child must turn inward as well as outward. The
baby is probably right in regarding itself as the centre of the universe, but age should learn better" (pp. 185-86).
In "Americanism" he criticizes "the amazing ease with which we
change our opinions and our parties, tinker with our constitutions,
make and unmake laws, and regard with ill-concealed contempt all
the government machinery and laws we have set up as mere experiments whose worth is only to be measured by their immediate
results" (p. 259). Like Frye, he uses Plato to censure the extremities,
vacillations, and hypocrisies of the democratic system.
Buck, then, is a neohumanist in his preference for order over
flux, his skeptical view of the pretensions of naturalism and progressive education, his concern that literature remain true to the
values traditionally attached to humanism. And as the last essay
illustrates, his conservatism, like all good conservatism, promulgates no obdurate adherence to the status quo. While he never
attacks democracy in itself, he is alert to its opacities and enthusiasms, and swings willingly the hammer of the iconoclast. lo
Buck's essays serve much the same function as Gass's: he develops
Frye's ideas, applies them to matters ignored by Frye, and employs
a more ingratiating and tentative manner. Finally, it is interesting
to note that just as Gass's most useful contribution to neohumanist
thought is his critique of the university elective system, so Buck's is
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his good-natured but penetrating analysis of the limitations and
doubtful assumptions of Montessori.

SECTION FOUR:
HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER

H. B. Alexander, like Buck an associate editor of the Quarterly, was
a regular contributor and one of the best known nationally of the
Nebraska humanists. A native of Lincoln born in 1873, he studied
at Nebraska and Columbia, then returned to the Department of
Philosophy at Nebraska. Without becoming a dilettante, he pursued an astonishing range of interests, publishing widely in the
areas of lexicography, aesthetics, philosophy, folklore, mythology,
and political theory. He was an active humanitarian and a practicing poet. In 1925 he lectured at the Sorbonne on the American
Indian. In addition, he was much interested in architecture, supplying the inscriptions and contributing to the symbolism of the
Nebraska State Capitol and other public buildingsY His pieces in
the Quarterly show him to be a resolute humanist, but markedly
different from Frye, Cass, and Buck.
The differences are clearly established in his first essay, "The
Socratic Bergson," where he quite disagrees with Buck's denigration of that philosopher. Instead, he includes Bergson within the
humanist tradition along with Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, and
Kant; each "sought to know first of all his own soul." In addition,
they were all concerned with moral knowledge as it pertained to
conduct, "knowledge that joins to action"; this is the only truly
humanistic sort (p. 33). He chiefly admires Bergson for refraining
from abstract and dialectical thought, a virtue allegedly shared by
Alexander's other favorite thinkers. Mental gymnastics can doubtless be good exercise, "but it is Cod alone who can always geometrise. For mere mortals the urgency of conduct is fundamental in
life ... ethics is the essential science; ontology and logic are
luxuries of the fortunate" (p. 34).12 Like Frye and the others, he
often appeals to Platonism, but in his discussions he commonly
emphasizes Socrates the teacher rather than his brilliant but more
systematic pupil. This bias preponderates in all of Alexander's
works: a strong distrust of overconceptualizing and excessive
analysis. In his magnum opus, for example, God and Man's Destiny,
he takes up the personhood of the Deity and the existential drama
of Christianity, deliberately ignoring, almost contemning, its

14 / The New Humanists in Nebraska
dogma and theology. Alexander thought naturally in architectural
symbols, and in the present essay he offers as an example of rampant schematizing the Mormon Temple at Salt Lake:
the most horrible monument I have ever beheld .... it is built with deadly symmetry
of line and angle, every joint conspicuous and every unity in relief,-exactly as a
child might build with blocks; and what makes it so horrible is just that it is infantile
in conception and monstrous in size ... we get from it the very shiver which the
deeds of the Cyclopes gave the Greeks. [Po 41],3

He esteems in Bergson, then, precisely those qualities repugnant to
a Frye or Buck. Bergson, for Alexander, is not anti-intellectual. His
intuitionalism is a proper, humanist recognition of the limits of
rationalism. His stress on movement is not a pusillanimous concession to the flux but a sign of his realism and a "studied protest
against the artifice and inconsequence of our mental legerdemain"
(p. 42).
Alexander's disagreement with the neohumanists is even sharper
in " 'Laokoon' and the Prior Question." There he examines recent
aesthetic theories of poetry, including Babbitt's New Laokoon, and
discerns in them all the sin of overdichotomizing. Babbitt, he says,
claims to be both a classicist and a humanist, and he argues for
restraint, the inner check, concentration of the will, etc. On the
other hand, H. N. Fairchild, another humanist, palpably espouses
romantic notions, and admires in poetry such qualities as selfprojection and self-realization. And yet, Alexander argues, the
"prior humanistic maxim, 'Know thyself,' " supports the contentions of both Babbitt and Fairchild. Moreover, these apparently opposed critics drive toward similar humanist conclusions. For Babbitt (and using Babbitt's own words), the "mediation between the
One and the Many ... is the highest wisdom of life"; for Fairchild
(again using his own words), the true value of poetry lies in the
"feeling of unity attained and continuity of experience emphasised." Alexander finds in these statements a difference that is
"verbal rather than speculative" (p. 347). He concludes that the
neohumanist opposition between classical and romantic dispositions is inutile: "The sharp antithesis of sense and intellect, feeling
and will, imagination and reason, we must reject as inherently false,
and conducive only to hypostatical idols and epithetical combats"
(p. 355).
These dichotomies at bottom, he maintains, merely contrast the
particular with the general, or the changing with the changeless.
The dialectical terms classic and romantic refer to attitudes toward
experience and methods of presenting impressions drawn from
nature, and he agrees with Frye that, mutatis mutandis, they are
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perennial. But neither method, approaching experience from the
general or the particular, can justly claim to be the true source of all
wisdom. And if what is called romanticism can degenerate into the
egotistic and subjective, classicism can become superficial and rigid
(pp. 355-56). A true humanist, Alexander believes, will not feel
threatened by the new areas excavated by modern thought. The
neohumanists "are too often men made timid by possessions, fearful of venturing the new lest they cease to prize what they already
have"; they are too eager to reduce romanticism to arrogance or
lunacy (pp. 356-57). " 'Laokoon' and the Prior Question" is thus a
superb complement and contrast to Frye's fundamental essay on
the terms classic and romantic. Frye is the pugilist, alert to differences and keen to draw lines; Alexander is the moderator, sensible
of the similarities among humanists and zealous for the common
ground: the fundamental or "prior" question, Do I understand
myself? From Frye's perspective Alexander is something of a
monist, though Alexander himself would probably have denied
that epithet.
Alexander's other essays, though less substantial, are consistent
with the humanism displayed in the first two. In "Music and
Poetry" he is less critical of nineteenth-century romanticism than
the neohumanists: at least it was willing, despite its faults, "to dare
all things" (p. 143). In "The Philosophy of Tragedy" he defines
Aristotelian catharsis as the production in the audience of "something of a broader understanding of life, something of the divine
compassion for all things human"-an interpretation of the term
by now sufficiently orthodox, but first promoted by theorists inclined toward romanticism. 14 In "Enemy Language" he takes up a
question glanced at by Gass and Buck: What are the social and
political values, in a democracy, of foreign language study? Although America may be truly styled the great melting pot, Alexander prefers variety to uniformity. We cannot expect every citizen to
be "melted down to the hue of the Revolutionary Anglo-Saxon."
We should encourage the immigrants to bring with them the best
from their traditions, and the best is usually formulated in the best
literature. "Traditions are not made in a day, and traditions which
are ideals purified out of centuries of experience are treasures not
to be disregarded" (p. 109). There is no doubt he would applaud
the current emphasis on polylingualism in education.
Alexander is thus a very different species of humanist from those
we have been considering. He challenges their classic-romantic
dichotomies; he is not so distressed by the sublunary flux-indeed
sometimes he delights in it-or by the audacities of naturalism. His
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Platonism, with its characteristically Socratic bent, does not bring
with it the familiar, neohumanist distrust of democracy; and his
admiration of Bergson certainly sets him apart. 15 His criticism of
the "melting pot" theory of cultural assimilation-a criticism common enough nowadays-was unusual at the time, and at odds with
the neohumanist bias towards uniformitarianism. Through his essays in general there circulates a freer and less fervid air than that
to be sniffed among the neohumanists. The grinding of axes is less
obtrusive. An advocate of the "prior maxim," he is conciliatory in
tone. One admires, finally, the balance he achieved in his own
career between the active and the contemplative life. 16
Yet there are weaknesses allied to these virtues, of which the
greatest is imprecision and nebulosity. If Socrates, Descartes, Kant,
and Bergson are all humanists because they are great truth-seekers
occupied with what is essentially human, it is difficult to imagine
any thinker of stature who might be excluded from this tradition.
Indeed, to denominate it a tradition in the first place is otiose, for it
wants uniqueness. On what grounds, for example, does a foe of
systematizing like Alexander choose to include Descartes in his
pantheon? Then, too, there is a kind of quiet optimism winding
through his essays which contrasts with the darker premonitions of
the neohumanists and which, depending on one's view, is either
healthy or complacent. Indeed, it all depends on one's view
whether Alexander be considered tolerant, open-minded, and resilient, or, at times at least, fuzzy and sentimental, with an aptitude,
quite absent in the likes of Frye, to lapse into trite passages of
"moral uplift." Is his contempt for analytics and dialectics a sign of
philosophical emancipation or, rather, symptomatic of a refusal to
think and discriminate precisely? Is he, in fine, a complex,
category-defying sage like Samuel Johnson, or a more talented but
intellectually befuddled second-rate dilettante like Elbert Hubbard? No doubt he is somewhere in between; and in any event, he is
the only one of the Nebraska humanists who represents that more
relaxed and diffusive sort of humanism to which the majority of
academics in the twentieth century have probably subscribed.

SECTION FIVE:
LOUISE POUND

Like Alexander, Louise Pound was a native of Lincoln, born a year
before him in 1872. She studied at Nebraska and the University of
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Heidelberg, then returned to Nebraska to produce over two
hundred articles and books on linguistics and folklore. Her four
pieces in the Quarterly are fine examples of her earlier work, and
the best two, on ballads, reflect strongly her interests at this time. In
1915, for example, she published a monograph, Folk-song of Nebraska and the Central West, to be followed by Poetic Origins and the
Ballad (1921) and a collection, American Ballads and Songs (1922). All
four of the Quarterly essays are neohumanist in outlook.
In her first, "The Literary Interregnum," she attempts to explain
the present dearth of talented writers by arguing that this is a
transitional period in which the old material has been worn out and
the new not yet developed. There will, inexorably, be new
thoughts, needs, and so forth, but the odds for poetry are not good.
The public demand is for prose, and so to prose, she correctly
predicts, the ablest writers will repair. Again correctly, she foresees
for poetry "the rhymeless lyric verse" and the general abandonment of conventional poetic diction. Finally, she agrees explicitly
with Babbitt that, having endured a centrifugal period during
which artists were enticed with eldritch and eccentric themes, we
may now anticipate a counter, centripetal movement "in the direction of centralisation, instead of miscellaneous expansion" (p. 81).
Her next essay, "Emerson as a Romanticist," shows even more
strongly the influence of Babbitt and, probably, Frye. In Frye's vein
she sees Emerson, like Whitman, as an exponent of the Roussellian
culte de moi; far from being a democrat, he was unsocial and a snob
to boot. The Victorians may have profited from his advice to leave
books and rely on intuition, but "to the modern reader, in reaction
from individualism, Arnold seems the wiser guide. The mediocre
must not be encouraged to trust themselves too confidently, rejecting the help which may come from culture" (p. 190). Also,
Emerson's benevolism and optimism now seem pathetically dated.
Emerson, for Pound, is the chief American adherent of that European romanticism castigated by Frye, and she concludes her piece
by contrasting the emotionalism and self-consciousness of the
nineteenth-century poets with the superior detachment and impersonality of the great writers, such as Homer, Chaucer, and Shakespeare (p. 194).
Her last two essays are more typical of her later work. In "NewWorld Analogues of the English and Scottish Popular Ballads" she
challenges two prevailing theories respecting the evolution of English popular ballads in the Old and New World: first, that those
ballads originated communally; and second, that the period of bal-
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lad making is over. Her evidence and train of logic defy brief
summary. She argues, basically, that poems of clear communal origin are deficient in facture, style, imagery, whereas the wellconstructed ballads point to a single, educated author (for example,
the songs of Stephen Foster are apt to endure much longer than
the "inconsequent creations emerging from the 'communal improvisation' of the negroes themselves" [po 178n]). Moreover, the factitious ballads are usually about the upper classes, while authentic
people's ballads are about themselves, and are artistically inferior.
Popular literature that has stood the test of time shows certain
signs, if not always of genius, at least of professionalism. She concludes that the best western American folk songs "are not those
which are the work of uneducated people of the Middle West or
the South, in spontaneous collaboration," but are the performance
of individuals, or adaptations from English and Scottish works,
themselves produced by individuals. She also argues that the making of ballads is by no means over. However, communal theories of
origins "have emerged from and ... belong to a period which
deliberately preferred the vague and the mystical, for all problems
of literary and linguistic history," and hence those theories are "out
of key in a distinctly anti-romantic period like our own .... Perhaps
when the cloud of romanticism overhanging it has vanished utterly,
we may again come to look on balladry as did the cultivated world in
the days of humanism" (p. 187).
"Ballads and the Illiterate" gives further arguments and examples to fortify her thesis that unlettered compositions are in fact
rudimentary, and that the theory of "minstrel authorship" is far
more persuasive than the communal theory (pp. 284-85).
Moreover, earlier versions of ballads are commonly superior to the
later, and exhibit unmistakable signs of artistry (pp. 287-88). "The
songs which impress the folk and find vitality among them are not
the uninteresting and nearly negligible kind of thing which they
are able to produce themselves" (p. 286).
With the possible exception of Alexander, Pound is more interested in popular literature and linguistics than the other Nebraska humanists. There is a notable freshness in both her style and
her choice of topics, especially in the last two essays. But her values
and attitudes are much closer to those of the neohumanists than to
Alexander's. The influence of Babbitt and Frye is quite apparent.
Like them, she is tired of the romantic chaos and looks forward to a
period of discipline and concentration; like them, she finds little
inspiring in the Emerson-Whitman side of the American tradition,
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preferring the more conservative Matthew Arnold. Her essays on
ballads, it should be noted, have a particularly antiromantic cast. A
pioneer in the scholarly study of popular literature, she is not
seduced, like some who have followed her, into sentimental cant
about "people's literature." Genuinely admiring the good old ballads, she pays them the honor of believing that they were prod uced
by talented individuals and did not erupt mysteriously out of some
amorphous and chthonic imagination. She is always determined to
discriminate the good from the mediocre or bad, and never permits these distinctions to be obscured by the glamour of egalitarian
aesthetics. 17 In fine, she understands that superior works of art,
whether in the popular field or not, are exertions of the individual
will, organizing into significant patterns the flux of existence. In
this she is one with the other neohumanists, and her theories have
been largely favored by supervening scholarship. IS

SECTION SIX:

W. G.

LANGWORTHY TAYLOR

Because Taylor was in the Department of Economics and Political
Science, it may seem odd to consider him a humanist. However, he
explicitly identified himself with conservatism 19 and wrote on
humanistic subjects as well as those within his competence professionally. He is the oldest of the academics surveyed here, having
been born in 1859 in New York City. He was educated at Harvard,
studied in Paris and the University of Leipzig, and joined the University of Nebraska in 1893. Though he became professor emeritus
in 1911 (at fifty-two), he continued to be very industrious, publishing his most important book, The Credit System, in 1913. Shortly
after his major articles appeared in the Quarterly, he became a most
voluble proponent of Woodrow Wilson's war policies and an
acidulous critic of those of his colleagues allegedly tainted by
pacifism or socialism. 20 His two most interesting contributions to
the Quarterly are long dialogues featuring, as a persona or spokesman, "the Man from the Moon." In the old, theological astronomy
all things above the moon were held to be permanent, and all
things below (sublunary) were suqject to the flux. I have already
noted how strongly the neohumanists detested the flux and its
apparent apologists (for example, Bergson). It is therefore appropriate that Taylor's persona should be a denizen of the moon, for
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as such he exhibits a perspective akin to that of the eighteenthcentury "spectator": detached, self-possessed, sometimes ironic.
The philosophical dialogue, as a genre, is quite versatile, and
certainly Taylor's dialogues could not be more different from those
of Gass and Buck. He does not, like them, exploit the form to
illuminate the intellectual and psychological complexity of the issue
under consideration; his tone is not, like theirs, tentative; there is
no compassionate survey of both sides while, Horatian-like, gently
drawing the reader to the better one. On the contrary, Taylor's
style is by comparison peppery, crisp, wittily assertive. The
dialogues of Buck and Gass draw their force from their probing of
subtleties and nuances of disputation and personality; despite their
authors' dislike of romanticism, the essays themselves seem curiously romantic, even Keatsian, in their protean and resilient form.
Taylor, on the other hand, is hard, opinionative, sometimes abrasive. He is, au fond, a satirist who in tone and technique is somewhere between Addison and Aristophanes, though to be sure on a
lower plane than both.
The first essay is entitled "The Man from the Moon, a J effersonian, and a Socialist." Despite his individualism, Jefferson has been
momentarily entranced by socialism and its apparent concern for
the commonality. But the man from the moon, attempting to exorcise this fascination, argues that capitalists indeed contribute to the
welfare of the state and manage economic affairs with infinitely
more sagaciousness than any state bureaucracy might do. State
socialism, he believes, cannot pay its own way, and such forms as we
have of it depend in reality on private enterprise. Further, there is
no reason to imagine that the state would be a more benevolent
employer than the capitalist, or that there would be no strikes in
such a scheme: "the abuse of the convict in the chain gang gives
some idea what is in store for the government employee who happens to belong to a political minority or to some department of
production or class of the population which is not in favour" (p.
302). The general public is persuaded by newspapers, professors,
and politicians always to' side with the workman, but we should
rather admire the captain of industry, who must needs "extract a
social service from a horde of half-savage anthropoids, eager to
murder or dynamite upon an artful suggestion applied to their
unresisting, inflammable nerves." We should respect those employers who daily risk their lives facing down mobs and bearing
"the brunt of an unsympathetic public opinion, worked by yellow
journalism" (p. 302). After all, it is necessary that somebody organize
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labor, and there is much evidence to show that capitalists are more
interested in the permanent betterment of the people as a whole,
even while they work for their own interests, than are the trade
unions or government bureaucracies.
The subject is then shifted to foreign affairs, and Jefferson
proudly if tritely proclaims that he is in favor of Mexico for the
Mexicans. But the Moon Man responds that the "white man is on
trial. Can he carry his burden? He cannot evade it. Having worked
out, in a measure, the problem of justice and spiritual uprightness
at home, he must not be indifferent to the needs of the rest of the
world. He cannot shut himself off from extra-territorial mankind.
He cannot meekly let them dispel him. He must conquer, but like a
crusader" (p. 306). Jefferson asks if he believes in war, to which he
replies that the word believe is inappropriate. He faces reality.
Idealists pronounce war an anachronism, but wars are more frequent than ever. Thus we must make the best of it: our soldiers are
not only more up-to-date, but more humane, than those of the
barbarous countries, and can set a good example for them. In
dealing with the tropical races especially, "the white soldier exerts,
on the whole, an elevating influence .... the white conquerer is little
disposed to excesses. The brown man knows no self-restraint toward
the vanquished. Moreover, the white man is rich enough to reward
as well as strong enough to punish. Paternal treatment calls for both
methods" (pp. 308-9).
The cast of the second dialogue is "The Man from the Moon, an
American Citizen, a Bull-mooser, and a Suffragette." The Bull
Mooser of course attacks capitalists as robbers, and the moon man
defends them; he also defends parliamentary or representative
government over populism, and the short ballot (less demanding of
the typical citizen) over the long one. In the most developed section, he chides a suffragette. He warns her not to eradicate the
proverbial, golden-egg-laying goose. Many laws protect women-in
the factory, in domestic life, and so forth. What, in the name of
pure equality, will become of these prerogatives? Moreover, he
notes a deterioration of marriage and the family for which "the
spirit of suffragism is largely responsible" (p. 165). Well, he later
concedes, perhaps he is overestimating the effect of female suffrage: if the "poor dears" want it, let them have it. But, he warns,
"men think there is rampant a disposition to ask for everything,
giving nothing in return. Women will be more than ever, under
suffrage, exposed to the vicissitudes of competition" (pp. 166-67).
He then jocosely inquires how much wages the housewife should
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receive; and the suffragette, more conventional than some of her
present-day sisters, agrees that the very suggestion is absurd,
though of course she argues for just pay for true work. The moon
man concludes on a philosophical note. There is rampant in the
land, he observes, the notion that the individual is everything and
should not be expected to accommodate himself to his surroundings. In other words, the world owes him a living, and if it does not
afford him the living he wants, he will revenge himself on it. But,
says the moon man, this is the argument of the "Apache" or the
adherent of the IWW who deludes himself into thinking "that capital has been robbed from the poor, not created by the capitalist.
Hence he proposes to destroy capital by violating his solemn word,
as understood in every contract of service, to respect his employer'S
property. The ends justify the means." To this pernicious viewpoint the feminist movement shows signs of succumbing. He concludes:
Prosperity destroys your world and calls for a new infusion of religion, as erstwhile, in
the time of the Nazarene. But the readjustment is likely to be unpleasant; it certainly
has in store some surprises .... I start for the moon this instant else I shall be drawn
into the campaign of suffretage and sabotage on earth. [Po 169]

Taylor'S other essays, which are not dialogues, express views
congenial with these. There is consequently no reason to doubt that
the man in the moon is Taylor'S own persona. Otherwise, so extravagant are some of his opinions, and so provocative some of his
rhetoric, that one might be tempted to argue that the persona, like
the projector in Swift's "Modest Proposal," is to be taken ironically:
that is, that Taylor himself is perhaps clandestinely a liberal ridiculing the troglodytic views of the right wing. But even taken
straight the essays are quite entertaining and display a zest and
humor uncharacteristic of the Quarterly. Although the man in the
moon sometimes calls himself a progressive,21 he obviously adheres
to conservative positions. He is critical of trade unions, socialism,
egalitarianism, egotistic individualism, and he favors capitalism,
private property, enlightened colonialism, traditional concepts of
society and the family. But although we are to take the persona
seriously, we are not on that account to overlook its use of irony
and deliberate exaggeration. Taylor'S attitude toward the socialists,
internationalists, wobblies, and suffragettes is similar to that of
Aristophanes, in The Clouds, toward Socrates, Sophists, the physical
philosophers: it is a mixture of authentic disapproval and intentional hyperbole. Like Aristophanes and that whole tribe of
satirists, Taylor knew that outrageous assertion is one of the best
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means of ridiculing and enraging an opposition deficient in humor
but not in self-importance. In the political and economic nature of
his subjects, as in the facetiousness of his style and tone, he is a
refreshing complement to the other more philosophical and literary Nebraska humanists.

2. Major Themes and
Other Writers in the
Mid-West Quarterly

SECTION ONE: PHILOSOPHY,
AESTHETICS, LITERARY CRITICISM

T

HE SIX SCHOLARS surveyed in Chapter 1 exerted the greatest
influence on the tone and slant of the Quarterly, and they were the
most noteworthy of the Nebraska humanists at that time. But to get
a complete notion of the subjects and themes stressed in the journal, it is necessary to examine some intelligent articles by less prolific Nebraskans and non-Nebraskans.
E. Benjamin Andrews was sometime professor of philosophy,
political science, homiletics, and history. As an educator and a controversial chancellor of the University of Nebraska, he won a national reputation. But he had retired and was quite elderly when he
wrote for the Quarterly, and his humanism strikes one, after reading
Frye or Alexander, as somewhat unsophisticated. An article on
Greek nationalism is representative of his thought. Had Greeceinstead of Rome-unified herself, he argues, and prevailed over
the future of the West, we would now enjoy a civilization "dominated by mind and not by brawn." This hypothesis is perhaps
plausible, but hardly substantial enough to support such an elaborate thesis as Andrews constructs. He ends, too, on a highly
theoretical and optimistic note, urging us, surrounded as we are by
"matter, crass, dull stuff," to "ram it full of mind" (p. 314). In "The
Renaissance" there is a similar optimism. He disparages the
medieval period as intellectually barren and devoid of genius: The
Canterbury Tales is in the main "a simple reproduction of Boccaccio's
Decameron"; Petrarch is more advanced than Dante in his
humanism (pp. 141-42). In the Renaissance, he concludes, "all
Western humanity ... started up to put away childish things.
24
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Not in a day, not in a century, was the old-time narrowness, crudity,
heathenism of religious thinking to pass away. Alas, it lingers still.
The mills of God grind slowly. But every moment since the Renaissance it has felt and been realizing its doom" (pp. ISO, 155).
Perhaps his most developed piece concerns "Art and Character,"
where he argues that art improves us morally (p. 240). The truth of
the "moral theory of beauty," although not demonstrable
mathematically, can be apprehended intuitively. The aesthetic
sense is not altogether to be identified with the moral sense, but it is
similar and should be cultivated. Appealing to Plato, he urges that
our love of physical beauty should lead to love of spiritual beauty;
but his discussion acquires a decidedly romantic and W ordsworthian tone: there are "sermons in stones and brooks and flowers and
hills, which we have no more right to ignore than we have to stop
our ears before a prophet of God" (p. 246). He believes that country folk are on the whole morally superior to city folk because of
their aesthetically preferable environment (p. 247), and though he
admits that our civilization somewhat resembles that of Rome just
before its fall, he ends, as in his other essays, hopefully: we have
hardly yet begun to apply the "art power and the consequent moral
power of our education," and if we begin to do this, we may hope
for the best (p. 250).
Andrews is clearly a humanist in his use of Greek culture and
Platonism as a standard, and in his belief in the connection between ethics and aesthetics. Yet the greater sophistication of Frye
or Gass, for example, in their analysis of the ethical elements in art
is most apparent. Andrews's facile depreciation of the middle ages,
his confidence in the future-these are attitudes quite uncharacteristic of neohumanism. Writing at the end of his life, Andrews
could look back upon a career full of signal achievements, and his
essays, sometimes pensive, sometimes optimistic, lack those acidulous aspersions of materialism, modernism, and democracy so frequent in Babbitt, More, and Frye. The essays have the idealism and
eloquence of age, but are tinged or tainted by superficiality, sentimentality, and complacency. This mellowness, to characterize it
generously, is very different from the brittle and strident style
sometimes employed by the younger humanists; yet they were understandably more sensitive than he to those dislocations-whose
preliminary tremors they had already detected-of the twentieth
century. Of all the younger humanists, H. P. Alexander is most like
him, though much more in touch with current thought; and it is
only just to record that it was Andrews who as chancellor appointed
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the outspoken Alexander to the Philosophy Department over the
strong protestations of its chairman. 1
There are no religious essays in the Quarterly, although two
pieces by Hutton Webster, the first professor of anthropology at
Nebraska, concern the philosophy of religion. In "Savage
Spiritualism" Webster undertakes a very tolerant analysis of
psychic phenomena in primitive societies; he is aware of the investigations of the Society for Psychical Research, and while he places
weight on the psychological explanations of these phenomena, he
leaves open the possibility of supernatural intervention. In "Newman on the Development of Christian Doctrine" he traces the antecedents of Newman's theory in Petarius, de Maistre, and so forth,
and compares Newman's procedure in his sphere 'with that of Darwin and Spencer in theirs. On the whole, Webster is more conservative than Newman, whose Essay on the Development of Christian
Doctrine contains "from the point of orthodoxy ... dangerous conclusions." What most distresses him is that Newman's theories expose the Catholic church itself to the flux of sublunary life. What
the Christian believes now may be but a phase, and the "impregnable rock" of Christianity might years hence look very different.
Hence Newman's own doctrine takes the first perilous step toward
"rationalism and liberalism" (p. 25). Webster is the only Quarterly
writer to take an overtly favorable view of orthodox Christianity,
but his fundamental theme is philosophical and typically
neohumanist: distrust of the flux. 2
The essays on aesthetics and criticism show the influence, but not
always the particular opinions, of Frye, Buck, and Gass. "Movie
Democracy" by Lewis Worthington Smith (Drake) is representative.
Smith attacks impressionism in poetry, since that school manifestly
disdains human concerns and values. He laments a general disintegration and "feminization" of the arts, and arraigns vers libre as a
symptom of that process (pp. 337-39). He takes the motion pictures as characteristic of modern art and its effect on life: "shifting,
uncertain, aimless, indecisive, [modern art] presents a series of
kaleidoscopic impressions passing over us as vainly as the shadow
of the villain across the screen at the theatre. Slipping from movie
to movie is an easy sort of self-indulgence, as any student of the city
streets knows, and the impulses so engendered are certainly impulses of disintegration" (p. 339). Romanticism and democracy
cooperate, sometimes, in fortifying selfish, individual obsessions.
Smith is not antidemocratic, but believes that in a democracy it is
especially essential "that each man should search, not for anything
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'through which he can most surely be himself,' but for that form of
expression and that way of living that most happily relates him to
his fellows" (p. 343). The values of the Anglo-Saxon culture, particularly its "active and constructive" insistence on personal liberty
and the "higher faculties," are preeminently important in American society. These values should be reinforced by healthy art, lest
we become "a conglomerate without homogeneity" (p. 345).
The other Quarterly critics, various and lively, nevertheless share
Smith's neohumanism. For example, Margaret Lynn (University of
Kansas) deplores the narrowness and provincialism of our native
literature by comparison with the European: its superficial optimism, lack of sophistication and a tragic sense of life. F. B.
Kugelman attacks Shaw's relativistic humanism. Hardin Craig
contends that the philosophies of a Carlyle or a Nietzsche are now
superannuated: "It is no doubt a splendid thing to make one's way
in the primeval forest with the bright efficiency of the timber wolf:
but after all, our teeth are not equal to it, and we are subject to
rheumatism" (p. 166). Robert Shafer, a staunch neohumanist later
to be quite a force in the movement, regards both archaeology and
naturalism as heirs of romanticism in their emphasis on the flux
and the ephemeral. Like Samuel Johnson and the old humanist
critics, he argues that great literature is "the expression of the thing
that everybody has believed or felt." T. K. Whipple attacks spineless, impressionistic criticism and promotes Arnold as a modelwho, however, is now disparaged by moderns because he tried to
"get definite results" in his criticism. 3
Although many of the essays are broadly theoretical, Bert Emsley
(University of Wisconsin) shows in his "Poetry of William Vaughn
Moody" how neohumanist principles can be applied to a specific
figure. Regionalism has appealed to many American critics, but not
to Emsley, for whom it is part of the flux. Consequently he does not
censure Moody for his antiregionalism: indeed, "there could be
little in the country home to hold a man of Moody's highly cultivated tastes" (p. 224). Moody's predecessors were Lowell and
Longfellow, embodiments, like him, of transplanted European
culture. Emsley admires these writers, but wistfully (and correctly)
predicts that these poets will probably give way eventually in our
schools to "native writers like Mark Twain and Whitman ... undistinguished in style but genuinely American in inspiration." Generally, Emsley is suspicious of sentimentalism and prefers poems on
universal themes. Like Louise Pound and Margaret Lynn, he is
indifferent toward "nativists" like Whitman, but he recognizes that
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he is probably on the losing side in aesthetics. In pedagogy, too, he
prefers-but senses that it is a futile preference-the classical ideal.
"And even in education the native school is already getting the lead
by shifting the emphasis in liberal studies toward history, politics,
sociology, and modern literature, as far away as possible from 'the
glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome' " (p. 229).
In the main, then, the critics of the Quarterly are neohumanist in
bent. The Emersons and Whitmans are not, they believe, what the
twentieth-century American needs. Disposed as he is by nature
toward lawlessness and provinciality, the modern American requires the conservative balance found in the more mature European literature and its American transplants. More Arnolds, not
more Whitmans, are to be desired. The Quarterly critics are firm in
their defense of western, and specifically Anglo-Saxon, cultural
values; and some of them foresee-but only to reject-the now
fashionable praise of pluralism and the concomitant loathing of
anything even remotely "chauvinistic."

SECTION

Two:

EDUCATION

Most of the essays on education show a familiar, neohumanist mistrust of centrifugal or fragmentary societies, but at the same time
they are often bold in their criticism of fashionable methodologies
and vocationalism. In "The Public School and the Painter," Horace
M. Kallen (University of Wisconsin), occupying a position similar to
Smith's "Movie Democracy," takes the motion picture as representative of modern life and art: it disintegrates "all the movements
into a series of isolated and motionless fixtures, machine-made,
and machine-controlled in reproduction" (p. 20). America especially lacks a central, inward character and integrity. Only in the
public schools have we an instrument for forging true national
identity, but we are on the verge of abandoning ourselves to a
mindless and anarchistic vocationalism. The public school, allied
with the artist, should foster Americanization and generate a set of
symbols that will profoundly express "the Nation's common and
constant mood and her central vision" (p. 25). Kallen is no crude
advocate of melting-pot acculturalization-indeed, he is now remembered as one of its earliest opponents. And he strongly opposes simpleminded political propaganda in education and art. But
like the other humanists, with the possible exception of Alexander,
he is more fearful than enamored of pluralism.
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Like Buck and Gass, Alfred D. Sheffield, "College Study of English," recommends a fixed curriculum and a unifying "idea" for
college education. To be sure, Sheffield concedes, one can educate
oneself merely by reading magazines, but the distinction of college
training lies in its producing order, coherence, and direction, a
"winnowed experience" (p. 202). He also attacks "professors who
emit personality directly through class-room sermonettes," and
questions the value of "leisure and spontaneous reading as the
really fruitful things in a college career" (p. 200). But Sheffield is
no stodgy pedant. He censures survey and period courses as ineffective, at least on the lower levels, and he disapproves of an excessive and sterile emphasis on mere facts. We should first offer
courses in how to recognize and read literature, and those ends can
be met only if we appeal to the students' own limited knowledge
and work from there. Thus Sheffield gives qualified approval to
what are now known as "relevance courses." Nevertheless, like
other neohumanists, he is most concerned with the values and ideas
in literature. Hence writers like Fielding, Dickens, Masefield, and
H. G. Wells, although rewarding subjects for leisure reading, are
too insubstantial to be accommodated by the formal curriculum.
Perhaps the most unconventional article is "Personality and Education" by H. K. Wolfe (University of Nebraska). Like Buck, Gass,
and Kallen, Wolfe opposes rampant vocationalism and, defending
education on humanist grounds, urges that it inculcate moral values. But unlike some of the humanists, he advocates considerable
flexibility in education: "Difference instead of uniformity will be
the aim of each teacher. The child will advance, not with his class,
but according to health, strength, ability, and willingness" (p. 270).
Wolfe admits that some restrictions on individual freedom are
necessary "in our moral and social worlds," but these restrictions
are not so requisite in our educational institutions. "The ideal of
completest personal development requires that every impediment
be removed from the life of the child, and that he be neither hindered nor deformed by extraneous forces" (p. 271). Of course
authority must be reverenced, but the value of obedience has been
exaggerated in our pedagogy. The child should not be drilled in
blind obedience, but rather be encouraged to develop self-control
(p. 272). Wolfe, whom H. B. Alexander called in his obituary a
Socratic, is hardly to be identified with the more radical modern
educators; but his essay contrasts strikingly with, for example,
Buck's "Puero Reverentia" (see chap. 1, Sec. 3). Wolfe was, for a
variety of reasons, a controversial teacher,4 and it is appropriate
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that Alexander should have executed his obituary for the Mid-West
Quarterly. Like Alexander, Wolfe represents a distinctly more
libertarian strain of humanism.
Other essays touch variously on education. There is a defense of
the professor who publishes (more information is always useful, no
matter how trivial it may seem, and a published professor wins
more admiration and authority in the classroom).5 The president
of the board of regents argues that universities and colleges have a
civilizing effect on societies, but should retain their aloofness and
refrain from religious and political entanglements. 6 One essay advocates something like a code of professional ethics for teachers.7 A
professor at Missouri recognizes and deplores those teachers who
"are experiencing a sort of crise de conscience with respect to
literature"-who are uncertain what to teach, or even what teaching is. He thus anticipates, and condemns, a very modern syndrome. But, significantly, he puts in a good word for popular literature and contemporary, undergraduate interests: "the age and
the student have their rights. Let us meet them half-way; ultimately, we shall have to do even more than that."8
One of the liveliest essays is Bert Emsley's on "Freshman English
and Creative Teachers." There he recounts, with some intentional
hyperbole, the burdens of a young instructor teaching freshman
composition, an occupation which produces in him the decay of all
idealism, creativity, and sense of style. Emsley urges that we adopt,
not necessarily a new official program, but at least a more enlightened attitude which, less preoccupied with historical and
philological subjects, would not condemn the young teacher to
hurry off "his theme work in ten hours in order to devote two
hours at night to counting syllables in a Middle English alliterative
romance" (p. 310). Such harried teachers should, rather, be encouraged to read widely and to develop further their creative and
cultural interests.
I have deliberately used Bert Emsley to conclude the first two
sections of this chapter. He is one of the better and wittier of the
minor contributors. But more important, his two essays--the one
on Moody, the other on freshman English-show a characteristic
pattern in neohumanist thought. In his essay on literary criticism
he emerges as a conservative classicist whose enthusiasm for the
romantic, nativist American tradition is decidedly restrained. Yet in
his article on education he is quite "progressive," questioning the
value of the then regnant historical and philological biases and
adopting an unorthodox view of how a young teacher should oc-
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cupy himself-in cultural self-development rather than dessicated
scholarship. This union of classical literary tastes and unconventional educational theory may seem odd, but one can observe it in
the leaders of the neohumanist movement as well. Both Babbitt
and More incurred the dislike of their fellow academicians as much
for their censure of modish educational schemes as for their
philosophical conservatism; both argued especially for fundamental changes in the graduate programs of American universities.
Such viewpoints, conservative in one way and iconoclastic in
another, are reflected in the Quarterly articles, Although the writers
on education generally favor a central and unifying curriculum,
they by no means espouse a rigid methodology. In several instances
they advocate as much individualizing of education as possible
without lapsing into total anarchy. They are tolerant of, and indeed
support, some kinds of curricular reform. Emsley's two articles,
then, exemplify a pattern found generally in neohumanism: a traditional or classical aesthetics infused by heterodox, or at least unconventional, pedagogical views.

SECTION THREE:
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
JUSTICE, COLONIALISM, THE FIRST WORLD WAR

There are two essays on justice, one by William Granger Hastings
(University of Nebraska), the other by Roscoe Pound (Harvard).9
Both are in the natural-law tradition of Edmund Burke. Hastings's
is well written but conventional in its emphasis on consensus and
prescription. Pound's is more venturesome and addresses a pervasive dissatisfaction with the efficiency and justness of American
courts. He recognizes that there are some new problems which
courts, established for the pioneer and agricultural communities of
the early nineteenth century, cannot easily accommodate. Hence it
is natural that today a "law-ridden people," finding the system too
sluggish or even comatose, should construct alternative instruments of justice: boards and commissions, juvenile courts, and so
forth. This is a dangerous development, for jurisprudence may
then yield to politics, the judge to the administrator, the court to
the judicial referendum (p. 225). The solution is to endeavor,
through good training in the law schools, to make judicial justice
more responsive, for we cannot, finally, have justice without law:
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"No form of conservation is more important than the conservation
of social institutions. And no social institution is of more value than
the legal tradition" (p. 233). Pound's argument, more intricate than
a paraphrase can suggest, is distinctly Burkean. He is opposed to
unprofessional, impressionistic interpretations of the law, but also
to a rigid and rationalistic set of rules claiming universality and
produced "by purely logical processes" (p. 230). He favors a flexible, organic, natural-law tradition, responsive to changing times
but ensuring security and continuity.lo
The question of colonialism and subjugated peoples is taken up
by two writers. J. E. Miller's "The English in Egypt" concedes that
because the world war has exposed the evils of race rivalry and
intolerance "our instinctive prejudice against the control of one
people by another has been very greatly deepened" (p. 332). Still,
not all people in the world should necessarily be given the right to
govern themselves. Besides, who has a right to govern Egypt? The
Turks? The Greeks? The Egyptian people, through history, have
never shown a great aptitude for self-rule. The English are not
altogether altruistic, but they are demonstrably more enlightened
and humane in their colonial supervision than the other potential
overseers (pp. 332-33).
In "Race Contact and Mixture in Colonies" Minnie Throop England (University of Nebraska) speaks unhesitatingly of "inferior
races," and though she opposes prejudice, she recognizes a rooted
antipathy between the races, especially those that differ in striking,
physical ways. Despite a terminology that is now unfashionable,
England's analysis of race relations is quite equitable and reasonably objective. Some would consider her a racist in her belief
that primitive peoples are often stimulated by contact with superior
ones and that "the Negro, with his inherited tribal instinct and
longing for a chief or leader, has always submitted to the supremacy of the white man as a natural state of affairs, and prospers"
(p. 171). In addition, she disapproves of race mixtures and argues
that even slavery had its advantages for the subjected class.ll At the
same time, however, she attacks "the degraded communism of Indian reservation life" and urges that educated Indians "be mingled
as common citizens of the Republic" (p. 176). She opposes exploitation, and closes on a "progressive" note: continuing studies in
environmentalism may show "in time that races potentially are
more nearly equal than is generally believed. The capabilities of the
inferior peoples have rarely if ever been given a fair test." Both
Miller and England are pragmatic, largely unideological defenders
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of colonialism as facilitating stability and justice. Both, like other
neohumanists, see no reason to question the excellence of their
own civilization and culture.
The articles on the war fall into two phases: those in the first
phase analyze the various historical, economic, and diplomatic
causes; the later ones debate America's role in the conflict and,
more specifically, the relative merits of belligerency and pacifism.
The April 1915 Quarterly was given over almost entirely to the war,
but since America was then neutral, the essays represent chiefly the
first phase.
The lead article is "The Diplomatic Background of the European
War" by Bernadotte E. Schmitt (Western Reserve University). This
is a sober dissection of the preliminary events, laying stress on
economics as well as diplomacy. Schmitt cannot be pronounced
altogether neutral: she reproaches German officials for being inflexible and unconciliatory (pp. 213-16). But she is signally impartial on the point of expansionism, contending that at one point or
another all the powers have "been arrogant and unscrupulous, and
to this extent all are equally responsible for the war" (p. 217). It is
true that Germany has not had the same opportunity as some other
nations to expand, and we must admit that "Deutschland fiber Alles
[is] as reasonable a slogan as Britannia Rules thl' Waves"; nevertheless, this misfortune of Germany's cannot excuse or even extenuate
unjust aggression (pp. 218--19). Another important cause of the
war, though, was the growth of the German navy, worrisome to
England because of her dependency on the sea. Schmitt also chastises the incendiary press of both Germany and England, which
made "the negotiation of an agreement, or at least a detente, unusually difficult, if not impossible" (p. 222). We must agree that England is in the right, Schmitt decides, but she concludes on another
tack, asserting that far from being antiquated, war is now more
ubiquitous than ever. Modern democracies have shown themselves
to be conspicuously chauvinistic; and, moreover, "one cannot help
feeling that behind the mazes of diplomacy and the ambitions of
nations, there has long existed on the part of governments and
peoples alike ... a subconscious desire to make use of the colossal
armaments accumulated during the last generation" (p. 229).
The next essay, "Colonial Aspects of the War" by Cephas D. Allin
(University of Minnesota), is equally moderate. He allows that English colonialism is highly enlightened, but also praises Germany:
"She has accomplished in the higher realm of thought and feeling
what England has in the lower world of politics-a true master of
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the souls of men" (p.236). But Germany is young as a nation, and
emerged out of "autocracy, not of democracy; of blood and iron,
not of constitutional agitation" (p.237). On top of this, she "has
inherited the splendid ideals of Roman culture and organization,
of the supreme but beneficent rule of a superior race. In this imperial conception there is no room for a competing civilization"
(p.237). This view naturally collides with English notions of individual and national liberty. Allin sympathizes, like Schmitt, with
Germany's desire for colonies, and censures the Monroe Doctrine
for intercepting her logical expansion in South America. But he
cannot condone her militarism, and he believes that the colonial
allies of England are defending, not merely the British Empire, but
"the constitutional principles of national liberty on which that empire is based" (p. 248).
"German versus English Aggression," by A. D. Schrag (University
of Nebraska), is of all the essays the most sympathetic toward Germany. He urges that we examine the present situation historically
and objectively. If we do this, we shall see that England over the
years has been as aggressive as Germany-indeed, she has been
more so. Hence aggressiveness should not be viewed as a German
racial trait. He then dilates on the controversies surrounding
Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine with a view to exculpating
Germany. Like Schmitt and Allin, he argues that, because of historical circumstances, Germany has been defrauded of a natural
colonialism, and that she subsequently took only what had been
discarded or disdained by others (p. 261). England is chiefly interested, not in a balance of power, but in her own supremacy, and
to maintain this supremacy she has resorted to high-handedness
and deceit; consequently, her attacks on Germany's morality are
hypocritical. In fact, most people in England and America asperse
Germany for her alleged philosophy-in other words, for her doctrine of life. "Germany is condemned to-day not for what she has
done or is doing, but for what people consider to be her intentions.
Germany, accordingly, finds herself in the position of the heretic in
the Middle Ages, who was persecuted not for his immoral deeds
but for his distasteful ideas" (p. 263).
A short piece by Sherlock Bronson Gass concludes this issue of
the Quarterly. In "The Ideal of Peace" he calls for calm, lucid
thought and an understanding of Germany's position. Why do we
praise the French for preserving her treaties with Russia, but condemn Germany for keeping them with Austria? Why do we praise
the efficiency of our activities but condemn that of the German
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army? Why do we not recognize that "Germany is the only one of
the fighting nations that since her formation in 1871 has not made
aggressions" (p. 290)? Moreover, though we claim to be peace lovers, yet our history shows we are not in principle against war. We
have always been willing to violate the "ideal of peace" in order to
make "our ideas of right prevail by force of arms." Life is not
"nice." Until human nature shall alter itself, there will always be
occasions when two peoples, genuinely committed to causes, are
prepared to fight for them. At such times, at least, there can only be
the ultimate arbiter of war (pp. 292-93). If we hope Germany is
defeated because we happen to admire France or England as
superior civilizations, we are conceivably rational, though perhaps
unfair. But to hope for the defeat of Germany because this will
produce universal peace is naive and fallacious. Universal and
permanent peace presupposes a world in which all nations think
alike, and that is a mere chimera. We can work for relative peace
only when we recognize that "in the presence of diverse knowledge
and diverse thinking, war is humanly inevitable." And once we
recognize that, the "first result ... would be to give the German
cause a fairer consideration than it has yet received at our door"
(pp. 294-95).12
Gass's discussion of pacifism introduces the second phase of the
controversy. His colleague P. M. Buck's "Pacifism and Ideas" (found
in "Screenings [No.2]") may well be the most sensitive contribution
to that debate. Buck identifies an idealistic pacifism which, however
contradicted on every page of history, has at least a quixotic beauty
and appeal. But there is another, repulsive kind, an "economic
pacifism" which fastens on the economic cause of war as the only
cause. This pacifism is as unrealistic as the first, and much more
ignoble. Were economic factors indeed the sole or even chief cause
of war, such pacifism would carry weight. But in fact people go to
war because they see that ideas are involved, and, as creatures with a
moral sense, they believe that it is important which ideas prevail.
Economic pacifism is a manifestation of that cynical materialism
which has "sunk deep roots into our whole theory oflife and civilization" (p. 373). Modern educational theories emphasize making
people economically efficient, and this "trade school ideal" has crept
into even our best universities and contributed to the appeal of
economic pacifism (p. 373). This species is most vigorous in the
Middle West, where we contemplate complacently our growing affluence and are insulated by geography from the rigors of the
conflict. Economic pacifism deplores the waste of wealth and life
entailed by war; but waste is a law of nature:
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For every oak tree there are a myriad of unfruitful acorns and a forest of blighted
saplings .... And what a terrifyingly uneconomic thing a mere courtship is with its
thousands of useless presents, its wasted sighs, and its perfunctory wedding fees ....
those who value our civilization only for its material benefits and social comities,
have at least one thing to learn ... that even the most transient of these are things to
gain which even the most pacific of men must sometimes risk even their lives. (P.
376). 13

The most indefatigable writer on this subject was Charles
Kuhlman, who produced three sometimes intemperate, sometimes
acute articles in which he denominates war a "great historic institution" and enumerates its virtues. War has discouraged alcoholism,
especially in Russia, and has stimulated inventions; it does not
cause the races to degenerate, but quite the reverse; it often brings
about social and political readjustments necessary "to give freer
play to the creative forces" of man; it can advance civilization, as we
see in the conquests of ancient Rome. Kuhlman sometimes lapses
into the ridiculous, as when he argues that the war "is not producing hatreds .... [it] is creating mutual understanding and respect
as each [enemy] discovers unsuspected virtues in his antagonist."
Yet he shows sense in denying that this war will end all wars; there
will always be new soldiers and new antagonisms. And there is
much to be said for his view that the only alternative to war may be
a federal police force that would rule by might or whim rather than
by justice, and under which freedom of local institutions and the
right of self-government might be suppressed or inexorably decay.
He remarks that it is naive to believe republican states are ipso facto
more pacific than monarchical ones. And with respect to Christian
idealism, he develops intelligently the distinction between the personal morality of the Sermon on the Mount and that practical morality which must be exercised in the outer world of compromises
and conflicting interests. 14
Only Francis T. Philbrick (University of California), in "Rational
Bases for Ultimate International Peace," advances a moderate
pacifist line. He believes that "democracy and liberalism" are
rapidly unifying the world, and that pacifism is implicit in
liberalism. There is much nobility in nationalism, he concedes, and
national cultures are richer than any international one might be.
Hence he agrees with conservatives on one point: doctrinaire
pacifists are misguided in desiring to eradicate all national cultures.
But the aggressive aspects of nationalism must be repressed. We
must establish some sort of international league and educate men
to sacrifice themselves for the commonweal rather than the nation,
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and to have a will to change the social order rather than meekly to
acquiesce in it. 15
These political essays, at first glance, may seem to express ideas
now in academic disfavor. Apologies for colonialism and war are
not welcomed at present in the professional journals. Yet on
further consideration they seem quite objective in the best scholarly
tradition. True, only one substantial essay supports pacifism, but
none of the articles, not even Kuhlman's, is conspicuously belligerent or incendiary. Indeed, the essays preponderate toward tolerance, calmness, equity, and include much admiration of German
culture and sympathy for her historic situation. There is no jingoism here, and no inconsequent optimism about the inherent
peacefulness of democracies. The University of Nebraska, like
many similar institutions during the Great War, was widely suspected by the general public of disloyalty. With that in mind, the
tone of these essays is especially noteworthy. Certainly they are far
removed from the strong anti-German sentiment apparently rife at
American universities even during the period of neutrality.I6 At
least two reasons may account for this moderation. In 1915-16 the
Middle West was notably less keen than the East to enter the war,
owing to its remoter location and ethnic composition. In addition,
the neohumanists, though in one way more extreme than moderate
conservatives of the time, were also less naive and optimistic, and so
less subject to fads and fanaticisms. It was precisely the moderate
conservatives who were apt to become, by 1917, the super patriots;
and no one more angrily denounced the pacifists than John
Dewey.I7
On pacifism, then, as on the plight of Germany, the essays are
evenhanded enough. Those by Gass and Buck best express the
neohumanist view that pacifism is unrealistic in light of human
nature; that, being unrealistic, it is not effective; that much
pacifism derives from the superordination of individual life over
ethical imperatives; and that even man's most hideous actions find
their source, not in economics or biology, but in morality and
idealism.

Conclusion

of a moral order: these are
probably the most fundamental imperatives of neohumanism.
"Civilization, at bottom, rests on the recognition of the fact that
man shows his true liberty by resisting impulse, and not by yielding
to it, that he grows in the perfection proper to his own nature not
by throwing off but by taking on limitations."1 This belief is promoted by all the major contributors to the Quarterly. It is seen in
their distinction between the restraining classical and the expansive
romantic sensibility, in their commitment to the higher reality (the
One) over the sublunary flux (the Many) and to the superiority of a
disciplined, liberal-arts education over vocationalism. It is seen also
in their concern for ethical norms in the arts and for self-sacrifice
in war. Of course there are disagreements. Alexander questions
Frye's classic-romantic dichotomy; Wolfe favors more individualism in education than Buck or Gass; Taylor promotes
capitalism and colonialism more explicitly than the others. But the
philosophical orientation of Quarterly must be plain by now; like
that of neohumanism in general it is at odds with the prevailing
tendencies of twentieth-century thought.
In an elaborate memorandum to Chancellor Avery, H. B. Alexander once suggested a variety of university reforms. Heading the
list of proposed "scholarly enterprises" was:

SELF-DISCIPLINE AND THE AFFIRMATION

An interpretation of English culture. We have heard much of German "Kultur" in
the past years, and have actuaJly, in our schools, known more of it than of the
Anglo-American tradition. There is no reason why Nebraska should not be a leader
among American universities in so interpreting English history, law, literature, and
the native American expansions of these, that our work should be everywhere
recognized .... Once begun the work could make the Mid-West Quarterly its organ,
and give the whole middle west a tone of distinction which it lacks!

This memorandum is undated, but it was probably prepared in the
summer of 1920. If so, the document tells us several useful things.
It suggests that the final number of the Quarterly, dated 1918 but
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actually published in 1919 (see Introduction), was not viewed at the
time as its last. The memorandum also shows that Alexander, one
of the journal's associate editors, had special plans for it. How the
Quarterly should have become an organ for interpreting the
"Anglo-American tradition" Alexander never explains. But one
guesses, in view of his other writings, that he might have made it
less exclusively neohumanist. Under his direction it might have
addressed, with less argumentative flourish, the "native American'
expansions" of English traditions; and at the same time it might
well have become more regional in its focus (it is to "give the whole
middle west a tone of distinction"). As a classicist and Platonist, Frye
had resisted such regionalization, but Alexander was a rather different sort of humanist from Frye.
Because the Quarterly did not survive, these are of course mere
conjectures, and they are not advanced with any great confidence.
After all, Alexander did believe in humanism, despite his disagreements with the Babbitt-More version. If his memorandum is
any sign, he would have featured the affiliations and ligatures between British and American traditions, however different the
minor emphases might have been. Thus his intentions for the
Quarterly might not have altered drastically its actual course. The
major contributors, as I have noted, had been educated in the
eastern regions of the country, often at Harvard, or, like Alexander
and Louise Pound, were Lincolnites who had done graduate work
in the East or abroad. There is clear evidence in their articles that
they considered it important to support and consolidate the supremacy of Anglo-American values in the plains. One might note, too,
that Alexander employs the phrase "native American" in its then
common acceptation: it refers to Anglo-Americanism. In the remark of another Nebraska humanist nearly sixty years later, the
phrase itself has acquired a very different meaning, and the viewpoint, too, contrasts with Alexander's: "For Nebraskans, the past
which is ours is that of the great Native American [that is, Indian]
civilizations of the Plains, and of the transformed Mexican, Black,
Scandinavian, Slavic, German, and Irish folk cultures whose selfconsciousness was formed in the nineteenth century liberal revolutions."3 Alexander was one of the first humanists to examine sympathetically the cultures of the American Indians; and as has been
noted, he prized the variety and individuality of the unassimilated
ethnic groups. But as a humanist he valued above these the greater
universality, in some cases the greater sophistication, of the
Anglo-American tradition. Even for Nebraskans, he seems to be
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saying, it is that civilization which is quintessentially theirs, and that
to seek stability in peripheral or decayed cultures is not conservatism but nostalgia.
Of course one can also feel nostalgia toward that "genteel tradition" for which, unsympathetic critics might say, Alexander wished
to make the Quarterly an organ. As George Santayana was even then
arguing, this genteel tradition was already "at bay." In his view,
nineteenth-century humanism had terminated in an arid agnosticism and idolatry of culture. The neohumanists of the early twentieth century, he rightly believed, reacted against this conclusion, a
conclusion no less lame and impotent for all the eloquence and
repute of Matthew Arnold. Santayana concurs with the newer
humanists that "the gist of modern history would seem to be this: a
many sided insurrection of the unregenerate natural man, with all
his physical powers and affinities, against the regimen of Christendom."4 But he contends that if the American neohumanists wish to
assert an absolute criterion of taste and morals against the flux and
chaos of modernity, they must embrace supernaturalism. They
should turn, in fact, to that form of su pernaturalism most readily
accessible to modern man: Christian Platonism, which recognizes a
supernatural order but preserves a humanistic orientation. 5 Santayana's diagnosis seems sound enough, however doubtful his prescription. He has clearly identified the central dilemma, possibly
the paradox, of neohumanism: it would eschew cramping,
theological dogmatism (hence remaining true to the humanist
ideal), yet at the same time construct absolute moral criteria and
standards of self-discipline against the corrosive relativism and
permissiveness of our age. Babbitt, to be sure, explicitly opposes
the thesis of Santayana's Genteel Tradition at Bay, asserting that one
may center on man, dispense with theological absolutism, and still
preserve firm standards. 6 But the animadversions of Santayana·,
and the like strictures of T. S. Eliot, have retained their force. 7
Of course I would urge that the neohumanists were offering
more than Santayana's dessicated genteel tradition. Their toughness of thought enabled them to survive the collapse of Victorian
conservatism after 1912, as Henry F. May has noted. They were at
their strongest, indeed, in the twenties and early thirties, though P.
E. More indicates in his letters to Frye that they were even then an
embattled minority. Their great weakness lay not in an effete gentility, but in their reluctance or inability to ground their arguments
in a coherent religious or metaphysical scheme. By the Second
World War neohumanism had spent itself. Those that continued
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its assaults on relativism, materialism, and naturalism often wrote
from a religious perspective: T. S. Eliot, C. S. Lewis, Eric Voegelin,
Reinhold Niebuhr, Malcolm Muggeridge, and others. The Quarterly betrays this weakness, for it contains no significant articles on
religion or theology. The foremost theoreticians among the Nebraska humanists are Frye and Alexander. Frye draws his
metaphysics chiefly from Plato, ignoring even that Christian
Platonism recommended by Santayana. Alexander is still less satisfactory. Actively hostile to any particular metaphysics, he advocates
a humanism consisting of a diverse and often contradictory congeries of thinkers.
The new humanists, it must be admitted, shunned deliberately
any distinct, philosophical scheme. They wished to meet the twentieth century head-on, and most of them believed that an overt
appeal to Christian or any other traditional metaphysics was ill
advised; it would represent a "retreat to the past." After the defalcation from Christianity of the eighteenth-century "Enlightenment" philosophers, after the naturalist-romantic triumph in the
nineteenth century, modern man (they felt) could never find solace
in a dogmatic and traditional faith. But in aiming at a true catholicism, the neohumanists seem to have failed, perhaps for being too
abstract and rationalistic. Whether there will be an enduring revival
of orthodox Christianity no one can say. But it is clear that the
vacuum left by an active and historic faith has been occupied, not
by humanism, but by varieties of two rampant dispositions. There
are on the one hand secularized religions like Marxism, radical
psychoanalysis, transcendental meditation; there are on the other
peculiar religious or quasi-religious sects: the charismatic movements, occultism, Gnosticism, and so forth. None of these satisfies
the universalist aims of neohumanism, and a number of them
promulgate the opposite of Babbitt's ideals of civilization, preaching emancipation rather than restraint, alleged self-fulfillment instead of self-denial, the vagaries of emotionalism in place of the
enduring certitudes of classicism.
Long before its excesses were apparent, Goethe termed romanticism a disease. The neohumanists of course agreed with this, but
their own view of romanticism has now been denounced a caricature, while at the same time their detested romantics have been
rehabilitated as authentic conservatives. s Other neohumanist principles, whether in the areas of philosophy, criticism, education,
politics, have been greatly aspersed. The aesthetics of the Quarterly
writers must seem ludicrously antiquated in an academic world
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presided over by the Northrop, not the Prosser Hall, Fryes. 9 The
new humanism was moribund by 1940; the Quarterly lasted but five
years; the names of the Nebraska humanists are known only to the
specialist. This movement, surely, cannot claim exorbitant importance. But at the same time the impartial observer might recognize
signs of a reaction against allegedly value-free formalist criticism
and of a new emphasis on the "human" or ethical aspects of art. He
may also conclude that the neohumanists were properly alarmed at
the destabilizing tendencies of relativism and subjectivism, irrespective of whether they were right in tracing the sources of these to
the romantics.
In the end, the intellectual battles of the twentieth century are
but a part of a much broader and inexorable conflict between naturalism or secularism, and faith in a transcendental or supernatural
world. What is more, in any age Santayana's "unregenerate natural
man" is always threatening, and the "genteel tradition"-let us define it, departing from Santayana, as the tradition of civilization,
self-restraint, recognition of a higher law-is always at bay. Viewed
thus, the Quarterly may seem a momentary diversion in a minor
skirmish; but its resolute and fastidious editor might have found in
these lines a satisfactory epitaph for his journal:
There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
And found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.
For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business. IO
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